This paper studies false data injection (FDI) attacks against phasor measurement units (PMUs). As compared to the conventional bad data detector (BDD), an enhanced BDD utilizing the effect of zero injection buses is proposed. Feasible conditions under which FDI attacks are unobservable to this enhanced BDD are discussed. In addition, a class of multiplicative FDI attacks that maintain the rank of the PMU measurement matrix is introduced. Simulation results on the IEEE RTS-24-bus system indicate that the these multiplicative unobservable attacks can avoid detection by both the enhanced BDD and a detector based on low-rank decomposition proposed in prior work.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, phasor measurement units (PMUs) have been widely deployed in power systems for monitoring, protection, and control purposes. With the ability to directly measure the bus voltages and phase angles with high sampling rate and accuracy, PMUs have the potential to play a significant role in real-time power system state estimation (SE) [1] , dynamic security assessment [2] , [3] , system protection [4] , and system awareness [5] .
The communication and computing devices that enable wide-area real-time monitoring and control of the electric power system have been demonstrated to be vulnerable to cyber-attacks [6] - [8] . As an increasingly important component of these devices, PMUs are also prone to cyber-attacks. Therefore, it is of great importance to evaluate the vulnerability of PMUs to potential cyber-attacks. The authors of [9] , [10] classify the potential cyber-attacks on PMUs as communication link damage attacks, denial of service attacks, data spoofing attacks including GPS spoofing attacks and false data injection (FDI) attacks.
FDI attacks involve an intelligent attacker who replaces a subset of measurements with counterfeits. We focus on the sub-class of unobservable attacks which render the false data as unobservable to the operator. For supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, prior work [11] - [18] has shown that attacks can be designed to have severe physical [14] - [18] and/or economical consequences [19] , [20] . The authors of [18] were the first to determine the conditions under which an attacker with limited resources and capabilities can launch an unobservable FDI attack on SCADA measurements. However, such conditions are not known for attacks on PMU measurements. Furthermore, the high cost of PMU installation restricts the PMUs to be placed only at a subset of all buses.
As a consequence, only a subset of bus voltages and branch currents are directly measured by PMUs. This leads to the new question that we address in this paper: under what conditions is it feasible to launch unobservable attacks against PMUs?
In [21] , Kim and Tong introduce a protection scheme by placing secure PMUs to simultaneously ensure observability and prevent FDI attacks. However, as PMUs are also prone to attacks, their approach cannot thwart FDI attacks when PMU measurements are compromised by attackers. The authors of [22] propose a decentralized FDI attack detection approach based on the Markov graph of bus voltage angles. The drawback of this approach is that it may not perform well when the system experiences a disturbance. An expectationmaximization based detector is introduced by Lee and Kundur in [23] to detect FDI attacks on PMUs, but it only assumes DC power flow model and requires the bus power injections to be known.
Using measurements obtained from deployed PMUs in the grid, [24] and [25] illustrate the low-rank nature of PMU data when it is structured in a matrix. Utilizing this low-rank observation, [26] , [27] propose a low-rank decomposition (LRD) based detector to detect FDI attacks on PMU measurements. On the other hand, the FDI attacks of most interest are those in which the attacker is not omniscient and omnipresentthis limited knowledge and limited capabilities of FDI attacks are often captured (see, for e.g., [11] - [17] ) by restricting attacker knowledge to a subset of the network and restricting counterfeits to a small number of meters. This latter restriction along with the above mentioned low-rank properties of a block of PMU data suggests that the resulting counterfeit PMU measurement matrix can be viewed as a linear combination of a low-rank (actual) measurement matrix and a sparse attack matrix (counterfeit additions to measurement). The authors of [26] , [27] show that an LRD-based detector can identify the column sparse FDI attack matrix assuming that the attacker attacks the same set of PMU measurements over time.
In this paper, we propose an enhanced bad data detector (BDD) that utilizes Kirchhoff's current law (KCL) at zero injection buses (ZIBs) in addition to the conventional residualbased BDD. We then identify a sufficient condition under which an attack is unobservable to this enhanced BDD. Furthermore, we propose a class of multiplicative unobservable FDI attacks that multiply the state matrix by a full rank matrix, thereby preserving the rank of the measurement matrix. We illustrate that these attacks can bypass the LRD detector via simulation on the IEEE RTS-24-bus system.
II. PMU MEASUREMENT MODEL
Throughout, we assume the power system is completely observable by PMUs. A PMU placed at a bus collects the complex voltage measurements at this bus and current measurements on all branches connect to it, typically at a rate of 30 samples per second [28] . These measurements are linear functions of the states, i.e., the complex bus voltages. Let p be the number of buses (states), and n be the number of synchrophasor measurements in the power system, at each time instant t, the PMU measurement model is given by
where w t is the n × 1 measurement vector; x t is the p × 1 state vector of complex bus voltages; e t is an n × 1 additive Gaussian noise vector whose entries are assumed to be i.i.d; H is the n×p measurement Jacobian matrix. The least squares estimate of x t ,x t , is given by [29] x
where H + is the pseudo-inverse of H. The conventional residual-based BDD performs χ 2 test on the residual vector
to detect bad measurements. Given an PMU placement scheme, (1) can be written as
where V t and I t are available voltage and current measurements at time t, respectively; I ′ is the reduced identity matrix with only rows corresponding to PMU buses; and Y is the dependency matrix between available current measurements and states. Each row of Y corresponds to a current measurement I i,j from bus i and bus j. It contains only two non-zero entries, Y ij at the ith entry and −Y ij at jth entry, where Y ij is the admittance of the line between bus i and bus j. PMU data collected over a block of time (e.g., 2 to 20 seconds) can be written as a matrix where each row vector corresponds to all PMU measurements at one time instant and each column vector consists of the measurements collected in the same channel over a period of time. The PMU measurements in (1) over N time instants can then be collected as
. . . ; e T N are PMU measurement matrix, state matrix, and noise matrix, respectively. Note that w T t , x T t , and e T t for t = 1, 2, . . . , N are the transpose of the measurement, state, and noise column vectors, respectively, in (1).
III. UNOBSERVABLE FDI ATTACKS ON PMU MEASUREMENTS
In an FDI attack, the attacker is assumed to control a subset J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of measurements. Thus, the attacker may
where the column support of the measurement attack matrix D, supp(D), is contained in J . An attack can bypass the conventional residual-based BDD if D = CH T for some nonzero matrix C, i.e.,W
From (2), the estimated state matrix without attack is given byX
and the estimated state matrix under attack is given bȳ
The residual matrix under attack is given by
is the same as that without attack. Therefore, attacks in the form of (7) cannot be detected by the conventional BDD.
A. Enhanced BDD Utilizing ZIBs
An attack in the form of (7) is perfectly unobservable if the network is comprised of only injection buses. However, if the network includes some ZIBs, (7) is insufficient to keep the attack unobservable. For example, in the 4-bus system shown in Fig. 1 , assume the attacker controls the PMU at bus 1 but not that at bus 4. If the attacker wants to change the state at bus 2, it needs to change measurement I 1,2 . This attack is in the form of (7) , and hence, can bypass the conventional BDD. However, since the attacker does not control the PMU at bus 4, it cannot change measurements V 4 and I 3, 4 . As a result, the state at bus 3 cannot be changed. If the state at bus 2 is changed, the current I 2,3 is changed. Thus, I 2,3 = I 3,4 , so the KCL of ZIB 3 is violated under this attack. The example above illustrates the potential of ZIBs in detecting FDI attacks. Let k be the number of ZIBs in the system. For the i th (i ∈ 1, . . . , k) ZIB q, let M be the set of all its neighboring buses, the dependency matrix A ∈ C k×p between injections at ZIBs and states is given by
For instance, in the system shown in Fig. 1, k = 1 ,
We define a new residual matrix for the enhanced BDD
In the absence of noise, an attack-free state matrix X always satisfies XA T = 0. The enhanced BDD performs χ 2 test on R e , and bad data is flagged if R e fails the test.
B. Feasible Conditions for Unobservable Attacks
As stated in the Introduction, the cost of placing PMUs in power systems is much higher than that of placing power meters. Because of this cost, PMU measurements are typically available only at a subset of buses, in contrast to SCADA measurements that are available almost everywhere in the network. Besides, PMUs and SCADA system collect different types of measurements. Thus, the conditions for launching unobservable FDI attacks on SCADA system do not directly generalize to PMUs.
An attack is defined to be unobservable by the enhanced BDD if, in the absence of noise, there exists a state attack matrix C = 0 that satisfies (7) and
Recall that J is the subset of PMU measurements controlled by the attacker. This attack is feasible if and only if supp(CH T ) ⊆ J . Suppose the attacker wishes to change the state at a single bus. As we have shown through the example in Sec. III-A, it may not be possible to launch this attack without detection by just changing the state at this bus. What we wish to find out is the conditions under which this attack is feasible. The goal of this attack is to change the state at a single bus, but not necessarily changing the state only at this bus.
Similar to [30] , let b be the bus that the attacker wishes to change state, the attack subgraph S b can be constructed as follows.
1. Include bus b in S b . 2. Include all buses adjacent to bus b in S b . 3. If there is a ZIB on the boundary of S b , extend S b to include all adjacent buses of such a ZIB. 4. Repeat step 3 until no bus on the boundary is ZIB. When more than one bus are to be attacked, the final subgraph will be given by the union of all these subgraphs. An attacker who has control over all PMUs in S can launch an unobservable FDI attack. If there are no ZIBs in S, this condition is sufficient and necessary to make this attack unobservable. However, this is merely a sufficient condition, if there are ZIBs in S. We now illustrate an example through the 6-bus system in Fig. 2 . Suppose the attacker wishes to change the state at bus 5. If we apply the subgraph approach described above, the resulting subgraph is the whole system. Thus, it would appear that the attacker needs to control all three PMUs. However, if the attacker controls the PMUs at bus 4 and 6, it can launch this attack without being detected. If the attacker wants to change V 5 , I 5,6 and I 3,5 are changed. Since the attacker does not control the PMU at bus 1, then according to KCL of ZIB 2, V 1 , V 2 , I 1,2 , I 2,3 cannot be changed, and consequently V 3 cannot be changed. To satisfy KCL at bus 3, the attacker can change I 3,4 and V 4 , and then this attack becomes feasible. Clearly, this attack is feasible under the condition that attacker only control PMUs at bus 4 and 6.
Generalizing these conditions is out of the scope of this paper.
IV. MULTIPLICATIVE ATTACKS

A. Prior Work: Attack Detection Based on Low-Rank Matrix Decomposition
Conventional BDDs cannot detect unobservable FDI attacks in the form of (6). However, exploiting the low-rank nature of the high-dimensional PMU data matrix W , the authors in [26] propose a new attack detection mechanism based on LRD so as to separate the low-rank matrix W and column sparse matrix CH T in (6) . The LRD detector is briefly reviewed below.
Given a post-attack measurement matrixW , an estimateŴ of the actual measurement matrix, and the attack matrixĈ are formed by solving the following convex optimization problem:
where Ŵ * is the nuclear norm ofŴ ; Ĉ 1,2 is the l 1,2norms ofĈ, i.e., the sum of l 2 -norm of columns inĈ; λ is a weighting parameter; andH is the normalized Jacobian matrix, where for each row vector H i ,H i = H i / H i . The objective (16a) is to minimize the rank ofŴ (captured by its nuclear norm) and the column sparsity ofĈ (captured by its l 1,2 -norm). After obtaining the optimal solution, (Ŵ * ,Ĉ * ) for (16), the set of attacked measurements and states can be identified as supp(Ĉ * H T ) and supp(Ĉ * ), respectively. Assume there exists unobservable attacks inW , such thatW = W + CH T . The authors of [26] prove that for a specific range of λ, i.e., λ ∈ [λ min , λ max ], the optimization in (16) can successfully identify supp(C), i.e., supp(Ĉ * ) = supp(C), under the assumption that every non-zero column of CH T does not lie in the column space of W .
B. Attack Design
We assume that the attacker has the following knowledge and capabilities:
1) The attacker has full system topology information.
2) The attacker has control of the measurements in J .
Given a PMU measurement vector w t at time t, an attacker can estimated state vectorx t using (2), and construct false measurements asw where F is a full rank matrix. If the attacker does this for N time instances, the resulting PMU measurement matrix can be written in the form of (7) as:
In order to remain unobservable, the attack must satisfy (14):
This class of attacks do not change the rank of the measurement matrix W , and is potentially undetectable by the LRD detector. However, the nuclear norm of W may change under attack. Since the LRD detector uses the nuclear norm of the measurement matrix as a proxy of its rank, these attacks may still be detected by the LRD detector.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate the efficacy of the unobservable FDI attacks introduced in Sec. IV. To this end, we construct the post-attack measurement matrixW with as in (17) . Subsequently, we solve the LRD detection optimization problem (16) forW to check if the attack matrix C is detected. We assume that the LRD detector selects 5 seconds worth of PMU measurements data, i.e., N = 150, while the attacker continuously injects bad data. The test system is the IEEE RTS-24-bus system. The convex optimization problems for LRD detection is solved with MOSEK on a 3.40 GHz PC with 32 GB RAM. λ is chosen to be 1.05 in the LRD detector.
A. Synthetic PMU Measurements Generation
An optimal PMU placement problem as introduced in [31] is solved to ensure the system fully observable with PMUs. The details of the PMU placement scheme and available measurements are illustrated in Fig. 3 . Buses in red are buses with PMUs. We generate synthetic PMU data over 5 seconds in the test system. A base case of the system operating status is obtained by solving an AC optimal power flow problem. To model realistic data with a disturbance, at the first time instant t after 1 second, we change the load at each bus by adding a random value d to the base load, such that d ∼ N 0, 60 1.1 (t−31) . We then solve an AC power flow to obtain the measured phasors of bus voltage and branch current as measurements at time instant t. The singular values for the synthetic measurement matrices are illustrated in Fig 4. It can be seen that these synthetic measurements have the same lowrank property as the actual PMU data as illustrated in [26] . Furthermore, we assume noiseless measurements, i.e., E = 0. 
B. Detection of Multiplicative FDI Attacks
We focus on unobservable 1-sparse multiplicative attacks and exhaustively test their detectability. Due to space limita-tions, we illustrate our results using two specific cases. One case illustrates that no attacks are detected, and the other case illustrates that attacks are detected at incorrect buses. To change the state at bus b, the entries of the attack matrix F are set to be
Clearly F is a diagonal matrix, and hence F is full rank. Note that due to the effects of ZIBs in (20) , it is not feasible to launch 1-sparse unobservable attacks targeting some buses, since changing their states requires the attacker to also change the state of other buses, as illustrated in the example in Sec. III-B. Fig. 5(a) illustrates the detection result when there is no attack. Fig. 5(b) illustrates the attack detection result for an attack on bus 4. F is constructed as in (21) with b = 4 and c = e j0.2 . Compare these two subfigures, we conclude that the LRD detector fails to detect the attack at bus 4. Fig. 5(c) illustrates the attack detection result for an attack on bus 16. F is constructed as in (21) A comparison of the l 1,2 -norm ofĈ * with no attack and with the attack at bus 4 for λ = [1.05, 1.5] is illustrated in Fig.  6 . It can be seen that the Ĉ * 1,2 with and without this attack are very similar. Intuitively, this attack cannot be detected by the LRD detector, and our result in Fig. 5(b) supports such intuition.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, unobservable FDI attacks against PMUs have been studied. We have introduced an enhanced BDD, and have given conditions under which the attacks are unobservable. Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks can be identified by the LRD detector. In this work, we have introduced a class of multiplicative attacks that can potentially bypass the LRD detector. Future work involves generalizing the conditions for launching unobservable FDI attacks and developing countermeasures for such attacks. 
